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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

SCOTT BOWMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960372-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Appellant maintains that the trial court erred by
concluding that the prosecutor's strikes against Mrs. Alires, and
My Dang were not purposefully discriminatory.

The prosecutor

struck Mrs. Alires because he claimed he had prosecuted another
person with the same last name who had stolen glasses from an
optician shop and given them to family members.

He claimed he

believed Mrs. Alires might be related to that individual despite
the fact that on her questionnaire she indicated that she did not
have any relatives who had been prosecuted for crimes.
69.

R. 367-

The prosecutor also struck Ms. Dang, a woman of Asian

descent, on the grounds that after listening to her verbal
responses to the court's questions she did not appear to have a
sufficient command of the English language.

R. 3 67.

prosecutor never individually questioned either woman.

The
Appellant

also challenges the court's ruling allowing the prosecutor to
comment on rebuttal during closing argument on Appellant's
failure to call a key State's witness.

During closing argument,

defense counsel argued that the State had failed to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it did not call to

the stand Mitchell, the man who initially identified Appellant as
the driver of the motorcycle.

R. 272-74.

In response, the

prosecutor argued that defense counsel should have called the
witness himself.

After defense counsel's objection was

overruled, the prosecutor repeated his remark to the jury.

R.

272-74.
ARGUMENT
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S STRIKES AGAINST TWO OF THREE
MINORITY JURY PANELISTS WERE RACIALLY MOTIVATED.
A.

Standard of Review

The State claims Appellant has failed to establish that
the prosecutor's strikes against Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires were
discriminatory.

The State begins by disputing Appellant's

assertion that this case presents a mixed question of law and
fact on review.

The State cites Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.

352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991) for the proposition that
Batson challenges are highly fact sensitive because the decisive
question will be whether the prosecutor's race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.

Since

there is seldom much evidence other than the demeanor of the
attorney who struck the jurors, the trial court's findings are
entitled to great deference.

See State's Brief, pg. 17-18.

This case, however, is different than the typical Batson
challenge because the determination of whether the prosecutor's
explanation was a pretext for discrimination does not turn
exclusively on the trial court's assessment of his demeanor.
2

The issue in this case is whether the prosecutor's explanations
for striking Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires are supported by the record
or whether those explanations are impermissible pretexts for
discrimination.
App. 1993).

State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 464 (Utah Ct.

The record in this case includes Mrs. Alires' jury

questionnaire and the video tape of the voir dire proceedings.1
Because the video tape is part of the record, this Court
stands in the same position as the trial court.

This case is

similar to Miranda cases where the trial court reviews the
transcript of the interrogation.

In those cases, there are

essentially no undisputed facts so the trial court's application
of the facts to the law are reviewed under a correction of error
standard.

State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App.

1993); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) .

The rationale for granting the trial court broad

deference simply does not apply in this case.
Though Batson challenges are generally the type of claim
where the trial court is given wide latitude, it is the role of
the appellate courts to develop the law to provide direction to
those whose responsibility it is to enforce it.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).

State v.

This Court should not

accept the State's invitation to abdicate any meaningful review
of Batson claims under the guise of deference to the trial court.

1

.
Both the State and Appellant have urged this Court to
review the video tape of the proceedings
in making its
determination of Appellant's Batson claim. See, State's Brief, pg.
27, and Appellant's Opening Brief, pg. 30.
3

As a matter of law, a prosecutor should not be permitted to
strike a minority juror based on a justification that does not
appear on the record to be true.
If any explanation, no matter how insubstantial
and no matter how great its disparate impact,
could rebut a prima facie inference of
discrimination provided only that the explanation
itself was not facially discriminatory, "the
Equal Protection Clause 'would be a vain and
illusory requirement.'"
Hernandez, 111 S.Ct. at 1876, 500 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting.)
The State would have this Court limit its review of the
"credibility" of the prosecutor to a determination of whether
was lying to the trial court.

he

The State misunderstands the

requirement that the defendant demonstrate purposeful
discrimination.

The State appears to equate an evil intent with

purposeful discrimination.

The State then argues that if the

trial court believed the prosecutor was "credible," judicial
review on appeal is foreclosed.

See State's Brief, pat. 17-19.

Batson was intended to safeguard against discrimination in all
its forms, both subtle and overt.

Racial prejudice "stems from

various causes and may manifest itself in different forms."
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 429, 111
S.Ct. 1364 (1991).

For example, if a prosecutor justified

striking all the African American people from the jury on the
grounds that they did not appear to be intelligent enough to
understand a complex white collar crime case, Batson would compel
reversal even if the trial court found that the prosecutor truly
4

believed that his grounds for striking the jurors were not
consciously race motivated.

The strikes would nonetheless be

based upon an impermissible racial stereotype.
Batson protects the integrity of the judicial system
against a prosecutor who strikes an Hispanic juror because he
hates Hispanics, as well as the prosecutor who strikes an
Hispanic juror because despite reliable evidence to the contrary,
he believes she is a liar and her relatives are thieves.

The

second prosecutor may have made his strike in "good faith," but
the strike is nonetheless based on race.

A prosecutor may in

"good faith" believe that Hispanics are prone to misrepresent the
truth, where it would not occur to him to question the veracity
of the Caucasian jurors.

A prosecutor may in "good faith"

associate an Hispanic person with theft cases he is prosecuting,
where he would not make that association with the Caucasian
jurors on the panel.2
The prosecutor in this case may have genuinely believed
Mrs. Alires had lied because her relatives were thieves and had
obtained stolen glasses for family members.

The trial court may

have believed the prosecutor acted in good faith.
does not end judicial review.

That finding

For example, in State v. Cantu,

778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II"),

this prosecutor

struck an Hispanic juror because he was angry at defense counsel

2

. The prosecutor, in this case, did not associate any of the
Caucasian jurors with common last names like Smith, Lawrence, or
Jacobsen with criminal defendants he has prosecuted with the same
name.
5

for insisting that Hispanics be impaneled on the jury.

The court

did not question his credibility when he insisted that he struck
the juror out of anger.

Nonetheless, the prosecutor's

justification was found to be racially motivated and reversal was
required.

Id.

B. The Prosecutor's Strike Against Mrs. Alires
Was Racially Motivated.
The State concedes that the prosecutor's failure to
question Mrs. Alires is "somewhat compromising."

However, the

State then speculates that there may have been a myriad of
legitimate reasons why the prosecutor failed to question Mrs.
Alires.

Ultimately, the failure to examine Mrs. Alires is a

factor weighing against the State.

Cantu II , 778 P.2d at 519.

The State's attempts to justify the prosecutor's failure
to question Mrs. Alires skirts the most troubling aspect of this
case.

The prosecutor gave an explanation for striking Mrs.

Alires that is not simply unsupported by the record, but is in
direct conflict with it.

The State's attempts to create

plausible explanations for the prosecutor's conduct are simply
inadequate.

The prosecutor knew that Mrs. Alires had stated

under oath that she had no family members who had been prosecuted
for a crime.

R. 341.

If he believed she was lying then this

Court must ask why he did not question the veracity of any of the
Caucasian jurors.

If he believed she was telling the truth,

then his explanation was merely a pretext for a hidden reason he
did not wish to reveal to the trial court.
The State attempts to avoid confronting this problem by
6

focusing on the prosecutor's claim he did not know Mrs. Alires
was Hispanic or that Alires is an Hispanic surname.
Brief pg. 24-25.

See State's

The prosecutor's claimed ignorance is as

suspect as his explanation for striking Mrs. Alires.

In Cantu

II, this prosecutor along with defense counsel chose prospective
jurors from a master list based on their Hispanic surnames.
P.2d at 517.

778

Not only does he appear to have some knowledge of

Hispanic surnames, it seems unlikely that a prosecutor living in
a city with a significant Hispanic minority population does not
know that Alires is an Hispanic name.
as a claim

His claim is as persuasive

that he did not know that Gonzales, Ramirez, or

Alvarez are Hispanic names would be.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the trial court's
ruling supports Appellant's claim that it was apparent that Mrs.
Alires was of Hispanic descent.

As part of its ruling, the

trial court noted the presence of another minority member on the
panel.

R.

3 69.

The court clearly based its ruling in part on

the racial composition of the panel.

Since the racial makeup of

the panel was part of the court's basis for ruling against
Appellant, one can safely assume that the court would have also
noted the racial identity of Mrs. Alires had she not appeared to
be Hispanic.

The trial court's ruling accepts defense counsel's

assertion that Mrs. Alires appeared to be of Hispanic descent.
R. 367.
Lastly, the State relies on State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d
769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) for the proposition that even if the
7

prosecutor's justification is deemed inadequate the court is not
compelled to find clear error.

See State's Brief, pg. 24-25.

In

light of recent United States Supreme Court opinions, Harrison
has questionable precedential value.

In Harrison, the prosecutor

justified striking two Hispanic women because of their gender,
and that "for whatever reason" he liked them less than the other
female jurors.

Id. at 778.

The court held that the prosecutor's

response was not race-neutral and amounted to no more than an
unsupported denial of racial discrimination.

Jd.

Despite the

failure of the prosecutor to give a legally sufficient response,
the court held that the trial court's finding of no purposeful
discrimination was not clearly erroneous.

Id.

In J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 114
S.Ct. 1419 (1994) the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids striking a potential juror from the panel because of
gender.
Harrison.

Thus J.E.B. has effectively overruled the result in
More importantly, Harrison's analysis is questionable

under Purkett v. Elem, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).
Elem held that after the defendant has established a prima facie
case of discrimination the "burden of production shifts to the
proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral
explanation.

If. a race neutral explanation is tendered, the

trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike
has proved purposeful racial discrimination."

115 S.Ct. at 1771

(emphasis added).
The prosecutor cannot "satisfy his burden of production by merely
8

denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely
affirming his good faith."

Id.

In Harrison, the State waived

the issue of whether the defendant had established a prima facie
case.

805 P.2d at 777.

And under Elem, the State also failed as

a matter of law to meet its burden of production.
1771.

115 S.Ct. at

Having failed to do both, under Elem the analysis would

have ended.

I

C. Appellant Adequately Marshalled The Facts In
Support Of His Claim That The Prosecutor's Strike
Against Ms. Dang Was Racially Motivated.
The State claims that Appellant failed to adequately

I
marshal the facts in support of his Batson challenge of the
prosecutor's strike against Ms. Dang because he did not mention
errors she made on her questionnaire.
19.

See, State's Brief, pg.

While Ms. Dang did make a couple of errors on her

questionnaire, her errors indicate more a confusion with the
format of the form rather than an inability to understand
English.

More importantly, the questionnaire is irrelevant to

the question of whether the prosecutor's explanation for striking
Ms. Dang should be believed.

When challenged for his strike of

Ms. Dang the prosecutor stated:
Judge, with respect to the -- Ms. Dang, when I
heard her speak, I --I was concerned about the
language problem. It had nothing to do with her
race, I -- she said she's been here six years,
and I -- when I listened, and I didn't want to
embarrass her by probing into that, when I
listened to her questions (sic), I thought, I'm
not so sure that her command of the English
language is what I would prefer; had nothing to
do with her race.
R. 368 (emphasis added).

The prosecutor justified his strike of
9

Ms. Dang on her verbal responses to the trial court's questions,
not her jury questionnaire.

The focus of a Batson claim is on

the prosecutor's stated justification for striking a minority
person, not appellate counsel's explanations after the fact.
D. The Lack Of Racial Similarity Between Mrs.
Alires, Ms. Dang, and Appellant Is Not Relevant
To His Claim That The Prosecutor's Strikes Were
Racially Motivated.
The State claims that the fact that Ms. Dang, Mrs.
Alires, and Appellant are of different races undermines his
Batson claim.

See, State's Brief, pg. 25-26.

assertion contradicts Powers.
425.3

The State's

499 U.S. at 411, 113 L.Ed.2d at

A lack of racial similarity is irrelevant to Appellant's

Batson claim.

Powers held that a defendant has third party

standing to raise a Batson claim on behalf of a stricken minority
jury. 499 U.S. at 416, 113 L.Ed.2d at 429. Powers also identified
the defendant's interest in neutral jury selection procedures.
3

.
The State's reliance on Higginbotham, Hernandez, and
Alvarez is misplaced.
Hernandez and Alvarez are factually
distinguishable.
In both those cases, the inference of
discrimination raised because the defendant and stricken jurors
were Hispanic was undercut by the fact that the prosecution
witnesses were also Hispanic. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 354, Alvarez,
872 P.2d at 458. The court was simply pointing out in both cases
that it would be illogical for the prosecutor to strike the jurors
because he thought that racial similarity between them and the
defendant would bias them towards the defense when his own
witnesses would also benefit from any racially motivated bias. Id.
These cases do not stand for the proposition that in all cases
racial dissimilarity undercuts the defendant's Batson claim.
Lastly, the State misstates the holding in State v. Higginbotham,
917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996) . In Higginbotham, the trial court relied
on racial dissimilarity in rejecting the defendant's Batson
challenge. Id. at 547.
However, the Supreme Court did not cite
this factor in upholding the trial court's ruling, but instead
focused on the court's assessment of the prosecutor's credibility.
Id. at 548.
10

The defendant has an interest "not because the individual jurors
dismissed by the prosection may have been predisposed to favor
the defendant; if that were true, the jurors might have been
excused for cause.

Rather, it is because racial discrimination

in the selection of jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the
judicial process and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding
in doubt."

499 U.S. at 411, 113 L.Ed.2d at 425.

The State misses the point of Powers when it argues that
because the stricken jurors were of different races Appellant's
claim is somehow diminished.

Powers recognized that in some

cases racial identity between the jurors and defendant might
explain the prosecutor's discriminatory strike.

But to assume

that this is the only form racism takes in the courtroom is naive
at best.

The source and form of a prosecutor's bias may have

nothing to do with the race of the defendant, and it may not be
limited to only one racial group.
at 429.

499 U.S. at 416, 113 L.Ed.2d

More importantly, the harm suffered by both the

stricken juror and the defendant is not related to any bias the
juror may have held in favor of the defense.
113 L.Ed.2d at 425.

499 U.S. at 411,

|

E. No Remand Is Required.
The State argues that the trial court's ruling supports
an implicit finding that the prosecutor appeared credible to the
court, and in the alternative, that a remand is required to
determine the race-neutrality of the prosecutor's strikes.
State's Brief, pg. 19.

See

The trial court rejected Appellant's
11

claim on the following grounds:
I think the case law makes fairly clear that the
challenge at least has to pose (sic) race-neutral
basis. It does not - - if I remember part of the
words of the Court, it doesn't have to be a good
reason, it simply has to be a neutral reason. I
will note for the record as well that there is a
person of obvious Indian descent who did remain
and was not stricken.
R. 369.

The trial court appeared to have been singularly

unimpressed with the prosecutor's justifications for striking the
jurors, but felt that Appellant had not proved purposeful
discrimination because the State had allowed one minority
panelist to remain on the panel.4

Later in its brief, the

State acknowledges that the trial court did rely on the
prosecutor's not striking the last minority panelist in its
ruling.

See State's brief, pg. 27.

The State also concedes that

the court rejected this basis for upholding peremptory strikes
against minorities in State v. Pharris,
Ct. App. 1993).

846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah

See also Cantu II, 750 P.2d at 597.

On this

point, Pharris and Cantu are indistinguishable from this case.
Utah courts have long recognized that to hold otherwise would
send a message that discriminatory strikes against minority jury
panelists are tolerable as long as held to an "acceptable level."
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1728, 476 U.S. 79, 106
(1986) .
This is not to say that the trial court failed to make a
4

. That panelist had
struck for cause in defense
relationship.
For those
remaining minority panelist

ties to law enforcement, and had been
counsel's prior trial because of that
reasons, defense counsel struck the
from the jury. R. 369-70.
12

finding on whether the prosecutor's justifications for striking
the jurors were race neutral and a remand is required.

Unlike

the court in Pharris, the trial court in this case did make
sufficient findings for review.

The court's findings are not

insufficient, they are simply not supported by the record.

And

the court's reliance on the fact that the prosecutor left a
minority panelist on the jury was erroneous as a matter of law.
See e.g. State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) .
A review of Utah cases reveals that in only three cases
the court has ruled that a remand was necessary to decide the
defendant's Batson challenge.

In all three cases the trial court

completely failed make a record.

In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d

591, 593 (Utah 1988) and Pharris, the trial court refused to
require the prosecutor to even respond to the defendant's Batson
challenge.

846 P.2d at 458.

Consequently, there was no record

for the appellate court to review.

And in State v. Span, 819

P.2d 329, 336-37 (Utah 1991) the trial court erroneously ruled
that defendant's motion was untimely.

Again, there was no record

for the court to review.5
II. APPELLANT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY COMMENTED ON
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO CALL A STATE'S WITNESS.
The State claims that Appellant failed to preserve his
claim that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof

5

. The court in Span also remanded for a determination of
whether the stricken juror was a member of a cognizable minority
group. 819 P.2d at 336-37.
13

to the defense when he claimed at closing arguments that
Appellant should have called a State's witness at trial.
State's Brief, pg. 42-47.

See

The State offers a myriad of reasons

supporting its claim that the issue was not properly preserved in
the trial court.
A. Appellant's Objection Was Sufficiently
Specific To Preserve The Issue On Appeal.
The State first claims that Bowman did not preserve the
specific argument that the prosecutor improperly commented on his
failure to call Mitchell as a witness.
42-44.

See, State's Brief, pg.

The purpose of preserving objections is well established:
The requirement of a specific objection on the
record ensures that the trial court will
understand the basis of the objections and have
an opportunity to correct any errors before the
case goes to the jury.

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988); Utah County v.
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983).

Counsel must either state a

specific ground for an objection or the nature of the objection
must be clear from the context of the question or the testimony.
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986).
In this case, immediately after the prosecutor commented
on the defendant's failure to call the State's eye witness the
following discussion took place:
Defense Counsel: Objection to that, Judge. Of
course, he's listed as a prosecution witness on
the police reports, and if I'd have known he
wasn't going to be here, I would have done that,
but -Prosecutor: Well, I'll object to him insinuating
that I knew he wasn't going to be here.
14

The Court: Well, I don't think that's what he
did. He simply -- Counsel indicated that if you
wished him to testify, you could have brought
him; so, I'll overrule the objection.
R. 281.

Looking at the context of defense counsel's objection,

it is clear that his concern was with the prosecutor's remark
that Appellant should have called the State's witness himself.
Counsel noted that the missing witness was a prosecution witness
and indicated his surprise that the State had failed to call him
at trial.

Counsel was then interrupted by the prosecutor.

The

court's response indicates that he also understood that defense
counsel believed that the State should not be allowed to comment
on the defendant's failure to call a prosecution witness.

It

must also be remembered that the trial court understood that the
objection was being made in the context of both defense counsel's
and the State's prior closing arguments.
As long as counsel states the substance of his argument
he need not say the magic words "missing witness inference" to
preserve his claim.

Such a hypertechnical requirement would not

be consistent with the policy underlying the requirement that an
objection be specific enough to enable the trial court to correct
the error.

In this case, the substance of Appellant's argument,

simply put, is that it is improper for the State to comment on a
defendant's failure to call a prosecution witness.

That is what

defense counsel said, that is the question the trial court ruled
upon, and that is the issue presented to this Court on review.
Also, contrary to the State's assertion, counsel was not
required to object again when the prosecutor, having received the
15

court's permission to comment on Appellant's failure to call a
key prosecution witness, repeated his prior remarks.

In Gilbert

v. State, 891 P.2d 228, 231 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) the court
reversed the defendant's conviction on the grounds that the
prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's failure to
call a witness.

The court noted that the prejudice against the

defendant was exacerbated by the fact that the prosecutor
repeated his improper argument after the judge's ruling.

Id.

The court rejected the State's argument that the defendant was
required to repeat his objection, move for a mistrial, or request
a curative instruction on the grounds that defense counsel "could
properly have concluded that further objection would be pointless
and might only result in drawing additional attention to the
improper argument."

Id.

The State also argues that defense counsel should have
filed a pretrial motion to determine whether or not use of the
missing witness inference would be permissible.
brief, pg. 46-47, n.30.

See State's

The record indicates that defense

counsel had no notice that the State would not call its eye
witness to the crime at trial and was surprised when it did not.
R. 281.

Under these circumstances it seems unreasonable to

require counsel to know before trial that a prosecution witness
will not be present.
B. Appellant Did Not Invite Error Because His
Comment On The Prosecutor's Failure To Call A
Material State's Witness Was Not Improper.
The State relies on State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
16

1987) for the proposition that defense counsel invited error by
commenting in closing argument on the State's failure to call
Mitchell.

See, State's brief, pg. 47-49.

on Tillman is misplaced.

The State's reliance

In Tillman, the court held that a

defendant cannot raise an argument before the jury, wait for the
prosecutor to respond, fail to object to the prosecutor's
response, and then complain it was improper on appeal.
at 561.

750 P.2d

Tillman's attorney brought up the fact in a death

penalty case that he would likely be eligible for parole in
fifteen years if the jury gave him a life sentence.

Tillman was

held to have invited the error when the prosecutor responded in
kind. Id. at 559-61.

|

This case is different from Tillman because Appellant was
entitled to argue the missing witness inference, but the State
was not.

This is not the "tit for tat" situation the court faced

in Tillman.

It must be remembered that the missing witness in

this case was a prosecution witness who had seen the chase and
had identified Appellant as the driver.

The missing witness

inference is premised on the notion that if a party fails to call
a witness who is peculiarly within his control, and that witness
would reasonably be expected to give favorable testimony, it can
be fairly inferred that the witness was not called because his
testimony would not have been consistent with that party's
theory.

State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985);

Gilbert, 891 P.2d at 230.
In this case, the defense could legitimately comment on
17

the State's failure to call Mitchell.

Mitchell was a prosecution

witness who could reasonably be expected to testify favorably for
the State by identifying Appellant as the driver.

He was also

not available to both parties.
It has been well said that the availability of a
witness is not to be determined from his mere
physical presence at the trial or his
accessibility for the service of a subpoena upon
him. On the contrary, his availability may well
depend, among other things, upon his relationship
to one or the other of the parties, and the
nature of the testimony that he might be expected
to give in the light of his previous statements
or declarations about the facts of the case.
United States v. Arendale, 444 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1971).
In Arendale, for example, the court held that the wife of the
informant who provided testimony against the defendant in
exchange for leniency could not reasonably be expected to give
favorable evidence to the defense and was for that reason
"unavailable" to the defendant.

Id. at 1266.

Similarly, in this case, Mitchell was a State's witness
who approached the police claiming that he had seen the chase and
that Appellant was the driver.

R. 152-53, 172.

Under the

missing witness inference, one can fairly conclude that because
Mitchell was a material prosecution witness, but was not called,
his testimony would not have been favorable to the State.
Counsel could also fairly argue that because the State failed to
call a material eye witness, it had not proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.

R. 273.

In comparison, no logical inference can be drawn from
Appellant's failure to call a prosecution witness whose testimony
18

would not reasonably be expected to favor the defense.

Mitchell

was not a material witness to Appellant's theory of the defense
that he was at home during the entire incident.

Lastly, it is

the role of defense counsel to test the evidence and point out
the holes in the government's case to the jury.

When counsel

made just that argument, the State responded by trying to shift
the burden of proof back to the defendant by improperly arguing
the missing witness inference.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and Appellant's Opening Brief,
Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse his conviction
and remand the case to the trial court with orders for a new
trial.
SUBMITTED this

/ 2 ^

day of May, 1997.

t^^

L ^

^

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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